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NO NEED TO BREAK NEW GROUND:
A RESPONSE TO THE SUPREME
COURT’S THREAT TO OVERHAUL THE
COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
Jennifer L. Pomeranz*
Commercial speech and core speech are fundamentally different,
and the basis for their current First Amendment protections reflects this
understanding. The purpose for protecting each type of speech is
unique, and the ability of the government to compel or restrict such
speech differs. Two distinct analytical frameworks and two different
tiers of protection have emerged.
The U.S. Supreme Court has afforded protection against
unwarranted restriction of commercial speech by applying intermediate
scrutiny under the test that it established in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission. On the other hand, the
Court has subjected regulations of core speech to strict scrutiny.
However, in 2011, the Court conflated the two analyses and relied on
core-speech precedent when it analyzed a commercial-speech issue in
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.
This Article argues that the Court must uphold the distinction
between commercial speech and core speech and that it must reject all
future opportunities to overhaul the commercial-speech doctrine. The
Court should continue using the Central Hudson test to apply
intermediate scrutiny to challenged regulations of commercial speech.
Further, this Article encourages the Court to better define the
intermediate scrutiny standard that Central Hudson set forth by
clarifying the second, third, and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson
test. Such clarification will encourage more consistency in lower
courts’ opinions in the realm of commercial speech.

* Director of Legal Initiatives at the Yale Rudd Center for Food Policy & Obesity at Yale
University; B.A., University of Michigan; J.D., Cornell Law School; M.P.H., Harvard School of
Public Health.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court has not upheld a commercial speech
restriction since 1995.1 In its most recent opportunity, the Court
found that the statute at issue in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.2
“hampered” at least some commercial speech, and it struck down the
law as violating the First Amendment.3 The majority threatened
stricter review but subjected the law to “a commercial speech
inquiry” because “the outcome is the same whether a special
commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is
applied.”4 However, even accepting the majority’s view that the law
implicated the First Amendment,5 the majority departed from
precedent establishing the commercial speech doctrine and
confusingly infused core speech cases within its proposed
commercial speech analysis.
IMS Health did not present the Court with a typical commercial
speech restriction, and the majority did not employ a traditional
commercial speech analysis. The dissent would have subjected the
regulation to rational basis review but alternatively found that it
should have passed First Amendment scrutiny.6 Prior to IMS Health,
the Court had not granted certiorari on a case assessing the
constitutionality of a commercial speech restriction since

1. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding a state bar rule that
imposed a thirty-day ban on targeted direct mail solicitations of persons involved in personal
injury or wrongful death actions).
2. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (describing a Vermont law that restricted the sale, disclosure, and
use of pharmacy records containing prescriber-identifiable information for purposes of marketing
or promoting a prescription drug unless the prescriber consented).
3. Id. at 2659, 2667.
4. Id. at 2664, 2667 (explaining that “heightened judicial scrutiny is warranted” and citing
both core and commercial speech cases, but then stating: “As in previous cases, however, the
outcome is the same whether a special commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial
scrutiny is applied. For the same reason there is no need to determine whether all speech
hampered by § 4631(d) is commercial, as our cases have used that term” (citations omitted)); see
also Michelle M. Mello & Noah A. Messing, Restrictions on the Use of Prescribing Data for
Drug Promotion, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1248, 1250 (2011) (“The term ‘heightened scrutiny’ is
critical and pointedly ambiguous. It might be a mere synonym for the midlevel scrutiny applied
under the Central Hudson test—but it might mean far more.”).
5. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2673–75 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority
deviated from precedential standards and that commercial speech is held to a more lenient
standard than core speech).
6. Id. at 2674–77.
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Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,7 decided in 2002. In
Thompson, the majority struck down the regulation under the
intermediate test developed in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission8 for restrictions on commercial
speech.9 The dissent would have upheld the restriction under the
same test.10 Justice Thomas concurred separately to express his longheld view that restrictions on commercial speech “should not be
analyzed under the Central Hudson test.”11 He has and continues to
be the biggest proponent of applying strict scrutiny to all regulations
of speech.12
In Thompson, as in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,13 decided
one year earlier, the Court acknowledged that not all the Justices
have embraced the Central Hudson test and its application to
commercial speech restrictions as a whole.14 Parties challenging
7. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
8. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
9. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 368. In the same year that the Court decided Thompson, it denied
certiorari for a case assessing the constitutionality of a commercial disclosure requirement;
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented from the denial of certiorari. Borgner v.
Fla. Bd. of Dentistry, 537 U.S. 1080 (2002). They opined that the case would have provided “an
excellent opportunity to clarify some oft-recurring issues in the First Amendment treatment of
commercial speech and to provide lower courts with guidance on the subject of state-mandated
disclaimers.” Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). But in 2010, the Court accepted and decided a
commercial disclosure case, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324,
1341 (2010), where the full court upheld the disclosure requirements as constitutional based on
precedent established in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). Justice
Thomas concurred separately to question the commercial speech doctrine in general and as
applied in that case. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1342–45 (Thomas, J., concurring).
10. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 378–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (joining in the dissent were Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, and Justice Ginsburg).
11. Id. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring).
12. Justice Thomas has been the most outspoken about his disagreement with the
commercial speech doctrine. Ironically, he wrote the majority opinion, applying the Central
Hudson test, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995), and joined the majority in one
of the very few cases where the Court upheld a commercial speech restriction under the Central
Hudson test, Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995). Justice Stevens, who
expressed anti–Central Hudson views, joined the dissent. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 635 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (joining in the dissent were Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg). Justice Scalia
has since tempered his anti–Central Hudson views. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Since I do not believe we have before us the
wherewithal to declare Central Hudson wrong—or at least the wherewithal to say what ought to
replace it—I must resolve this case in accord with our existing jurisprudence . . . .”).
13. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
14. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367–68; Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554 (“Petitioners urge us to reject
the Central Hudson analysis and apply strict scrutiny. They are not the first litigants to do so.
Admittedly, several Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson
analysis and whether it should apply in particular cases.” (citing Greater New Orleans Broad.
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commercial speech restrictions on First Amendment grounds often
urge the Court to reject Central Hudson in favor of strict scrutiny
based on this disagreement.15 Thus far, however, the Court has not
explicitly found any case to require it to depart from Central Hudson
and “break new ground.”16 IMS Health followed this pattern.
In IMS Health, the respondents cited the “collection of opinions”
questioning Central Hudson for the proposition that a “majority of
current justices have suggested that all laws suppressing the content
of speech should be subjected to strict scrutiny, even when the
speech could be classified as ‘commercial.’”17 Commercial entities
seek strict scrutiny application to restrictions and compulsions of
commercial communication in order to have wider ability to
communicate without government interference. However, the impact
of such a radical transformation of the commercial speech doctrine
would be detrimental to consumers and directly contravenes the
Court’s original purpose for finding that the First Amendment
protects commercial speech. Further, applying strict scrutiny to
commercial speech is not a straightforward proposition. There are a
wide range of implications that would result from the Court
retreating from intermediate scrutiny.
This Article argues that the Court should never find it
appropriate to “break new ground” and overhaul the commercial
speech doctrine to provide commercial speech with enhanced First
Amendment protection. The outcome of judicial interpretation
should not always be “the same whether” commercial speech is
involved “or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is” necessary because
core speech is implicated.18 There are fundamental differences

Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999); id. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring); 44
Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501, 510–14; id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 518 (Thomas, J.,
concurring))).
15. See e.g., Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23, IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263
(2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 09-1913cv(L), 09-2056cv(CON)), 2009 WL 8379444, at *23.
16. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554–55 (“But here, as in Greater New Orleans, we see ‘no need to
break new ground.’ Central Hudson, as applied in our more recent commercial speech cases,
provides an adequate basis for decision.” (quoting Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 184)).
17. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 15, at 23 (“Justice Thomas repeatedly has
called for abandonment of intermediate scrutiny ‘[i]n cases such as this, in which the
government’s asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to
manipulate their choices in the marketplace.’ Publishers agree with this reasoning . . . .”
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
18. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011).
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between core and commercial speech, and First Amendment analysis
should reflect this.
This Article continues in Part II by distinguishing between core
and commercial speech. Part II also discusses the importance of
retaining these distinctions in order to enable the government to both
protect and inform consumers. If the Court altered the current
commercial speech doctrine, serious implications would result.19
Part III discusses such consequences in the context of commercial
disclosure requirements. Part IV addresses the need to maintain
intermediate scrutiny for restrictions on commercial speech based on
the values underlying the First Amendment. This is necessary in
order to protect consumers from false, misleading, and deceptive
commercial speech.
Part IV further argues that the Central Hudson test has proven to
protect commercial speech against unwarranted government
restrictions for decades despite the fact that its application has not
been straightforward. Because it would be dangerous to depart from
well-established precedent applying intermediate protection to
commercial speech, the Court should explain this standard in future
cases. Rather than corrupting the distinction between core and
commercial speech, the Court should provide expanded explanation
through future commercial speech cases to clarify the boundaries of
the doctrine.
II. THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CORE
AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH
A. Core and Commercial Speech
Have Their Own Intricacies
Parties and Justices who argue that it is possible to have one test
(strict scrutiny) to determine if restrictions on core and commercial
speech are constitutional, and one test (strict scrutiny) to determine if
19. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 56
(2000) (“The alternative vision implies, for example, that the First Amendment could no longer
countenance compelled disclosures within the realm of commercial speech. . . . Nor could the
Court any longer tolerate regulations of commercial speech that were significantly more
overinclusive than those accepted within public discourse. The same precision of regulation
would be applicable to both. Nor could the misleading requirement any longer be
employed . . . .”).
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compulsions of core and commercial speech are constitutional, fail to
appreciate the different needs, protections, and values underlying
both types of speech.20 The freedom of speech under the First
Amendment embodies the Constitution’s “commitment to the free
exchange of ideas,”21 which reflects the national commitment to
open debate of “public issues” and “governmental affairs.”22 Thus, at
the core of the First Amendment is the protection of ideas and most
often takes the form of political and religious speech.23 On the other
hand, commercial speech is a recent construction that has been
defined as “speech that proposes a commercial transaction.”24 The
majority of commercial speech cases involve government restrictions
on advertisements for products and services.25
In his dissenting opinion in Garcetti v. Ceballos,26 Justice
Breyer stated:
I begin with what I believe is common ground: . . .
Because virtually all human interaction takes place through
speech, the First Amendment cannot offer all speech the
same degree of protection. Rather, judges must apply
different protective presumptions in different contexts,
scrutinizing government’s speech-related restrictions
differently depending upon the general category of
activity.27

20. Id. (“The Court thus seems to be working its way toward a fundamental choice. It can
either continue the task of fashioning doctrine on the assumption that the First Amendment
safeguards the informational function of commercial speech, or it can overturn its prior doctrinal
structure and remake commercial speech doctrine as though it were protecting participation
within the process of self-government. I do not think that the Court has thoroughly canvassed the
enormous implications of the latter alternative.”).
21. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002).
22. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
23. See id. (“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”); see also Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) (explaining that religious speech is
protected under the First Amendment).
24. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989).
25. Post, supra note 19, at 5.
26. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
27. Id. at 444 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal numbering omitted) (majority holding that the
First Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline of public employees for making
statements pursuant to employees’ official duties).
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Justice Breyer went on to contrast a political speech case with
cases addressing commercial and government speech.28 Justice
Thomas disagrees that this is common ground and has offered
opinions on the other end of the spectrum. Justice Thomas believes
that restrictions and compulsions of core and commercial speech
should garner the same strict scrutiny.29 But Justice Thomas’s view
fails to consider that there is not one single strict scrutiny test for
restrictions and compulsions of core speech. In fact, the Court has
established two different tiered degrees of protection in both the core
and commercial speech areas.30
Core speech has many intricacies. Normally, core speech
receives the highest level of First Amendment protection, but this is
not always the case. The Court upheld the Federal Communication
Commission’s ability to regulate offensive words in broadcast
radio,31 a state’s ability to ban the sale of indecent material to youth
under age seventeen,32 a school’s ability to regulate student
expression in a school newspaper,33 a school district’s ability to
regulate union communication in teachers’ school mailboxes,34 and a
city’s ability to limit political speech on its transit system vehicles.35
Strict scrutiny was not used to analyze any of these restrictions on
core speech; therefore, they represent a reduced level of protection
for core speech in limited circumstances. Specifically, based on the
28. Id. at 444–45 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(political speech); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (government speech); Cent. Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, (1980) (commercial speech)).
29. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575–76 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring);
see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1343 n.1 (2001)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that he doubts “an entirely different standard of review for
regulations that compel, rather than suppress, commercial speech” is justified); Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496–97 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he statute at issue here
should be subjected to the same stringent review as any other content-based abridgment of
protected speech.”).
30. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410.
31. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); see also Fox Television Stations, Inc. v.
FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 325–26 (2d Cir. 2010) (“And the Supreme Court has continuously reaffirmed
the distinction between broadcasting and other forms of media since Pacifica. . . . While Pacifica
did not specify what level of scrutiny applies to restrictions on broadcast speech, subsequent
cases have applied something akin to intermediate scrutiny.” (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 866–67 (1997); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989); FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984))).
32. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
33. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
34. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
35. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
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mode of transmission (broadcast media), or the different levels of
protection granted to children, or the occurrence of speech on the
government’s own property, core speech can sometimes be restricted
without implicating or resorting to strict scrutiny.36
Commercial speech, likewise, has various facets to it.37 The
commercial speech doctrine has developed over the years, starting in
1976 with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.38 (which confirmed that commercial speech
is protected by the First Amendment to a different degree than core
speech is) and continuing to the 1980 Central Hudson case39 (which
defined the intermediate test for restrictions on commercial speech
and confirmed that false, deceptive, and misleading commercial
speech is not protected by the First Amendment). These cases were
followed by Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel40 in 1985
(which found that commercial disclosure requirements are subject to
“reasonable” basis review) and then Lorillard41 in 2001 (which
applied United States v. O’Brien42 to regulations of conduct that may
implicate commercial expression). In 2002, the Court took up the
36. Cf. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 n.11 (2010) (“First, in
traditional public forums, such as public streets and parks, ‘any restriction based on the content
of . . . speech must satisfy strict scrutiny, that is, the restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling government interest.’ Second, governmental entities create designated public
forums when ‘government property that has not traditionally been regarded as a public forum is
intentionally opened up for that purpose’; speech restrictions in such a forum ‘are subject to the
same strict scrutiny as restrictions in a traditional public forum.’ Third, governmental entities
establish limited public forums by opening property ‘limited to use by certain groups or dedicated
solely to the discussion of certain subjects.’ As noted in text, ‘[i]n such a forum, a governmental
entity may impose restrictions on speech that are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.’” (citations
omitted)). The Supreme Court originally used the term “nonpublic forum,” Ark. Educ. Television
Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998), but recently changed the term to “limited public
forum.” See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 n.11. The dissent in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
& Educational Fund, Inc., used “limited public forum” to indicate “designated public forum.”
473 U.S. 788, 817 (1985). The Ninth Circuit uses the term “limited public forum” as a “subcategory of a designated public forum.” Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 968 (9th
Cir. 2008). Understandably, there has been some confusion regarding the designation of “limited
public forum.” See, e.g., Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 76 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004).
37. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (“As our review of
the case law reveals, Rhode Island errs in concluding that all commercial speech regulations are
subject to a similar form of constitutional review simply because they target a similar category of
expression. The mere fact that messages propose commercial transactions does not in and of itself
dictate the constitutional analysis that should apply to decisions to suppress them.”).
38. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
39. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
40. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
41. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
42. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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issue again in Thompson43 (which emphasized that regulating speech
must be a last, not first, resort), and again, in 2011, in IMS Health44
(which subjected a regulatory program that affects commercial
speech to First Amendment scrutiny and brought content- and
speaker-based concerns into the commercial speech context).45 The
Court has generally become more hostile to commercial speech
restrictions along the way.
In both the core and commercial speech contexts, some speech
remains unprotected by the First Amendment. Some seemingly core
speech garners no protection under the First Amendment, including
obscene speech,46 defamation,47 and inciting—or fighting—words.48
But the First Amendment does protect the related sexually oriented
depictions,49 false and erroneous political and religious statements,50

43. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).
44. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
45. Id. at 2677 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Thus, it is not surprising that, until today, this Court
has never found that the First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting the use of
information gathered pursuant to a regulatory mandate–whether the information rests in
government files or has remained in the hands of the private firms that gathered it.”); see also
Kevin Outterson, Higher First Amendment Hurdles for Public Health Regulation, NEW ENG. J.
MED., Aug. 18, 2011, at e13(1), e13(1) (originally published Aug. 3, 2011) (“Instead of dealing
with this statute under existing precedent, Kennedy seized the opportunity to expand the First
Amendment’s reach and power to strike down government regulation of health care
information.”).
46. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131
S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (“[T]he obscenity exception to the First Amendment does not cover
whatever a legislature finds shocking, but only depictions of ‘sexual conduct.’”).
47. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
48. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (“Other distinctions based on content have been approved in the years
since [Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)]. The government may forbid speech
calculated to provoke a fight. . . . It may treat libels against private citizens more severely than
libels against public officials. Obscenity may be wholly prohibited. And only two Terms ago [in
Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976),] we refused to hold that a
‘statutory classification is unconstitutional because it is based on the content of communication
protected by the First Amendment.’” (citations omitted)); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at
all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace.”).
49. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
50. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964).
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and “misguided, or even hurtful” speech.51 Restrictions on protected
core speech receive strict scrutiny, and courts must determine
whether the speech is protected prior to applying the appropriate test.
Similarly, in the commercial context, false, deceptive, and
misleading commercial speech are not protected by the First
Amendment.52 But potentially misleading commercial speech is
protected to an intermediate degree, like other commercial speech.53
And then there is false speech—the one area that is more
straightforward in the context of commercial speech than it is in the
context of core speech. False commercial speech is not protected,54
but when it comes to core speech, this category is unclear.55 The
Court famously explained in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.56 that
erroneous statements of fact are “inevitable in free debate”; thus, in
the area of core speech, the First Amendment requires the protection
of “some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.”57 Hence,
false statements have been tolerated, but it is unclear how far this
allowance reaches. For example, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits came
to opposite conclusions regarding the constitutionality of the Stolen
Valor Act, which proscribes lying about military achievements and
permits punishment thereof as a criminal offense.58 Both courts
relied on Gertz as the basis for their holdings.59
The Ninth Circuit found the Act to be a content-based speech
restriction subject to strict scrutiny, under which it failed, and noted
that finding otherwise would create a slippery slope of criminalizing
lying in general, such as about one’s height, weight, and age.60 The
51. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574
(1995) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (finding that the First Amendment
protects racist political speech by a Ku Klux Klan group leader)).
52. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
53. Id.
54. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976).
55. Rickhoff v. Willing, No. SA-10-CA-140-XR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96557, at *17 n.4
(W.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2010).
56. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
57. Id. at 340–41.
58. Compare United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding the Stolen
Valor Act unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 457
(2011), with United States v. Strandlof, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1494 (10th Cir. Jan. 27, 2012)
(upholding the Stolen Valor Act as constitutional and not offending the First Amendment).
59. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1202–11; Strandlof, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1494, at *9–10, *25–
42.
60. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200.
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Tenth Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, reading the Act
to include a scienter requirement, and finding the Act constitutional
since it “does not encroach on any protected speech.”61 The Supreme
Court has granted certiorari on the Ninth Circuit case.62 Whatever
ultimately happens to the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act,
these cases highlight the uncertainty surrounding protection of false
statements in the core speech realm.
Conversely, there is no question that false statements of
commercial speech are not protected.63 For example, if a car
company falsely claimed to win an award by Car and Driver in its
television advertisements, there would be no question that this would
not be protected as commercial speech. This distinction is not based
on the speaker but on the speech. To the extent that people can make
“erroneous statement[s] of fact”64 on political matters, so can
corporations.65 However, it would undermine the very value of
commercial speech to make similar allowances when the same
corporations seek to propose a commercial transaction to an
unassuming party.
B. Core and Commercial
Speech Benefit Society Differently
The purpose and constitutional values at stake for protecting
core speech are fundamentally different from those underlying the
protection for commercial speech. For core speech, the First
Amendment guards against government interference for the benefit
of both the listener and the speaker. Justice Marshall aptly observed

61. Strandlof, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1494, at *14–15, *52–53; see also United States v.
Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815, 819 (W.D. Va. 2011) (finding the speech at issue “is not ‘speech
that matters,’” so it falls outside First Amendment protection (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341)).
62. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 457.
63. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“Not only does regulation of inaccurate commercial speech exclude little truthful speech from
the market, but false or misleading speech in the commercial realm also lacks the value that
sometimes inheres in false or misleading political speech. [T]he consequences of false
commercial speech can be particularly severe: Investors may lose their savings, and consumers
may purchase products that are more dangerous than they believe or that do not work as
advertised. [T]he evils of false commercial speech, which may have an immediate harmful impact
on commercial transactions, together with the ability of purveyors of commercial speech to
control falsehoods, explain why we tolerate more governmental regulation of this speech than of
most other speech.” (citation omitted)).
64. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
65. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 906–07, 917 (2010).
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that “the First Amendment protects . . . the freedom to hear as well as
the freedom to speak. . . . The activity of speakers becoming listeners
and listeners becoming speakers in the vital interchange of thought is
the ‘means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth.’”66 This type of exchange only occurs in the realm of core
speech.
In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court explained that the primary
purpose for protecting commercial speech is to ensure the free flow
of commercial information to benefit the listener to support
intelligent and well-informed consumer decisions.67 The Court
consistently emphasized that the “extension of First Amendment
protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value
to consumers of the information such speech provides.”68 In Virginia
Pharmacy, the Court also identified several reasons justifying the
“different degree of protection” for commercial and core speech:
commercial speech is more durable and easily verifiable by the
speaker, there is less likelihood of it being chilled, and the audience
often receives its sole source of information from the commercial
actor itself who alone can verify its accuracy.69 Upon this strong
foundation the commercial speech doctrine emerged. This rationale
has guided courts, regulators, and commercial actors since 1976 and
is at the foundation of the government’s ability to effectively protect
consumers from corrupted or incomplete speech.70
66. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 775 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)); see, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (finding that the First Amendment protects racist political speech by a leader of a Ku Klux
Klan group).
67. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764–
65 (1976).
68. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); see also City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 432 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting
the “Court’s emphasis on the First Amendment interests of the listener in the commercial speech
context”).
69. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771–72 n.24; cf. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I have observed previously that there is no
‘philosophical or historical basis for asserting that “commercial” speech is of “lower value” than
“noncommercial” speech.’” (quoting 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring))).
70. See, e.g., Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“Innumerable federal and state regulatory programs require the disclosure of product and other
commercial information.” (citing 2 U.S.C. § 434 (reporting of federal election campaign
contributions); 15 U.S.C. § 78l (securities disclosures); 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (tobacco labeling); 21
U.S.C. § 343(q)(1) (nutritional labeling); 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (reporting of pollutant concentrations
in discharges to water); 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (reporting of releases of toxic substances); 21 C.F.R.
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In order to uphold these principles, the Court must maintain the
First Amendment’s reduced protection for commercial speech.
Interestingly, the Court has made the opposite argument for
maintaining a reduced protection for commercial speech in that
“parity . . . could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the
force of the Amendment’s guarantee with respect to [core] speech.”71
Parity of constitutional protection for core and commercial speech
would also have the opposite outcome of creating an unfair and
inefficient market where the government could not adequately
inform and protect consumers. Since commercial speech is “the
offspring of economic self-interest,” only by maintaining
intermediate protection for commercial speech can we ensure that the
bargaining process is fair and consumers are protected.72
The government must be permitted to compel factual
commercial disclosure requirements,73 effectively deal with
misleading and deceptive commercial speech,74 and protect
consumers from overreaching by commercial speakers.75
Commercial actors are guarded against “unwarranted government
regulation” through the intermediate test created in Central Hudson.
These essential aspects of the commercial speech doctrine serve
society’s “strong interest in the free flow of commercial information”
in order to protect and maintain transparent and efficient markets
based on “intelligent and well informed” consumers.76 In the absence
of intermediate-level protection, this system could not be maintained.
Consumers would be unprotected and the U.S. markets would cease
to be efficient.

§ 202.1 (disclosures in prescription drug advertisements); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (posting
notification of workplace hazards); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (“Proposition 65”;
warning of potential exposure to certain hazardous substances); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§ 33-0707 (disclosure of pesticide formulas))).
71. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
72. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980)
(citations omitted).
73. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
74. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771–72.
75. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 634; cf. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475
(1989) (“The Court of Appeals also held, and we agree, that the governmental interests asserted in
support of the resolution are substantial: promoting an educational rather than commercial
atmosphere on SUNY’s campuses, promoting safety and security, preventing commercial
exploitation of students, and preserving residential tranquility.”).
76. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764–65.
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III. THE COMPULSION
OF CORE AND
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
A. Commercial Disclosure Requirements Are
Necessary to Protect and Inform Consumers
The divergent constitutional value of protecting commercial
speech supports the government’s ability to require factual
disclosures, without which commercial speech would only benefit
the speaker and his economic interests. This would be in direct
contradiction to the initial purpose of protecting commercial speech
in the first place.
The Court consistently confirms its preference for transparency
in commercial transactions and consumer access to truthful
commercial information to make informed decisions.77 This predates
Virginia Pharmacy. As early as 1919, the Court found that “it is too
plain for argument that a manufacturer or vendor has no
constitutional right to sell goods without giving to the purchaser fair
information of what it is that is being sold.”78 As a result, the U.S.
regulatory landscape includes commercial disclosure requirements so
consumers have truthful information relevant to the products and
services available in the commercial marketplace.
To this end, the Court has found that commercial disclosure
requirements are constitutional if they are reasonably related to a
valid government interest. The Court has decided two cases on this
issue, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States79 in 2010
and Zauderer in 1985, both expressly recognizing and upholding a
commercial disclosure requirement as “reasonably related” to the
government’s interest.80 In both cases, the government’s interest was
“in preventing deception of consumers.”81 It has been argued that
preventing deception is the only appropriate government interest to
uphold disclosure requirements,82 but this is not the case. First,
77. See, e.g., id. at 765.
78. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431 (1919).
79. 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010).
80. Id. at 1341; Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
81. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1341 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651) (unanimously
upholding a requirement that professionals must disclose that their services are for debt relief
under the Bankruptcy Code).
82. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132–34 (2d Cir.
2009) (describing how Appellant argued that Zauderer’s “rational basis test” is limited “to those
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several Justices have also identified the danger of incomplete
information to justify disclosure requirements;83 and, second, all
circuit courts to consider that argument have disagreed.84 Circuit
courts have expressly found that compelled disclosures are
constitutionally valid if they are instituted simply to “better inform
consumers about the products they purchase.”85 There are hundreds
of requirements currently in the commercial marketplace that
primarily function to provide consumers with factual information to
promote informed decision-making, and sometimes nothing more. It
is true that many prevent deception or correct the dangers of
incomplete information, but many are implemented to promote
informed decision-making by providing information.86
In Zauderer, the Court confirmed that “the extension of First
Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally
by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides,
[so commercial actors’] constitutionally protected interest in not
providing any particular factual information in his advertising is
situations in which the law at issue furthers the State’s interest in preventing deception of
consumers”); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 310 n.8 (1st Cir. 2005) (“PCMA
states that the holding in Zauderer is ‘limited to potentially deceptive advertising directed at
consumers.’ . . . [W]e have found no cases limiting Zauderer in such a way.”).
83. For example, Justice Stevens in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. recognized the interest in
protecting “consumers from the dangers of incomplete information.” 514 U.S. 476, 492 (1995)
(Stevens, J., concurring). The dissent in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., found that
disclosure requirements could be implemented to avoid misleading or incomplete commercial
messages. 521 U.S. 457, 490–91 (1997) (Souter, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., and
Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Zauderer thereby reaffirmed a longstanding preference for disclosure
requirements over outright bans, as more narrowly tailored cures for the potential of commercial
messages to mislead by saying too little. But however long the pedigree of such mandates may
be, and however broad the government’s authority to impose them, Zauderer carries no authority
for a mandate unrelated to the interest in avoiding misleading or incomplete commercial
messages.” (citations omitted)).
84. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 132–34; Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n, 429 F.3d at
310 n.8; Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 851 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Nat’l Elec. Mfrs.
Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a statute requiring the disclosure
of information related to mercury contained in light bulbs was valid in order to inform consumers
about such dangers of the product).
85. See Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 115 (“To be sure, the compelled disclosure at issue here was not
intended to prevent ‘consumer confusion or deception’ per se, but rather to better inform
consumers about the products they purchase. . . . Accordingly, we cannot say that the statute’s
goal is inconsistent with the policies underlying First Amendment protection of commercial
speech, described above, and the reasons supporting the distinction between compelled and
restricted commercial speech. We therefore find that it is governed by the reasonable-relationship
rule in Zauderer.” (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651)); accord Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n, 429
F.3d at 310 n.8.
86. See Post, supra note 19, at 4.

Winter 2012]

NO NEED TO BREAK NEW GROUND

405

minimal.”87 Disclosure requirements are based on the “informational
function” of commercial speech and the accepted understanding that
it would be impossible for consumers to verify such information on
their own.88 As a result, the U.S. regulatory landscape is replete with
commercial disclosure requirements—“that the speaker might not
make voluntarily”—both to give consumers truthful information
about products and services and to protect consumers from economic
and physical harm.89
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for example, imposes
mandatory disclosure requirements on publicly traded companies.90
The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 requires the
disclosure of ingredient and nutrition information on food and
beverage products.91 The Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer
Protection Act of 2004 requires the disclosure of the presence of
eight common food allergens.92 The Federal Hazardous Substances
87. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (citation omitted); see also id. at 651 n.14 (“The right of a
commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information regarding his services is not such a
fundamental right.”).
88. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 & n.6
(1980).
89. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 492 & n.1 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“In the commercial context . . . government . . . often requires affirmative disclosures that the
speaker might not make voluntarily.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77e (requiring a registration statement
before selling securities); 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (requiring “Surgeon General’s Warning” labels on
cigarettes); 21 U.S.C. § 343 (1988 ed. & Supp. V) (setting labeling requirements for food
products); 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1988 ed. & Supp. V) (setting labeling requirements for drug
products))); see also Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 116 (“Innumerable federal and state regulatory programs
require the disclosure of product and other commercial information. To hold that the Vermont
statute [requiring disclosures for mercury-containing products] is insufficiently related to the
state’s interest in reducing mercury pollution would expose these long-established programs to
searching scrutiny by unelected courts. Such a result is neither wise nor constitutionally
required.” (citing 2 U.S.C. § 434 (reporting of federal election campaign contributions); 15
U.S.C. § 78l (securities disclosures); 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (tobacco labeling); 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1)
(nutritional labeling); 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (reporting of pollutant concentrations in discharges to
water); 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (reporting of releases of toxic substances); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1
(disclosures in prescription drug advertisements); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (posting notification of
workplace hazards); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (“Proposition 65”; warning of
potential exposure to certain hazardous substances); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 33-0707
(disclosure of pesticide formulas))).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006).
91. 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
92. Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-282,
118 Stat. 891, 905–11 (2004). This Act provides a good example of a law that could arguably be
related to preventing deception, but clearly was passed to simply inform consumers of
information that only may be relevant to their health and safety. Peanut allergies are the most
common cause of fatal food-induced anaphylaxis in the U.S. Fred D. Finkelman, Peanut Allergy
and Anaphylaxis, 22 CURRENT OPINION IN IMMUNOLOGY 783 (2010). In the absence of
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Act requires that labels disclose whether a product is toxic, corrosive,
flammable, or combustible.93 Federal law also requires the Surgeon
General’s Warning to be posted on tobacco products to inform
consumers of the health hazards associated with using tobacco,94 and
it requires alcohol-content disclosures to be listed on beverage
packaging and labels.95 States have their own sets of disclosure
requirements in areas ranging from credit card applications to
lotteries and time-share proposals.96 There are innumerable federal
and state laws requiring the disclosure of factual information that
promote transparency, fairness, informed decision-making, and fair
and efficient commercial markets.97
In his concurring opinion in Milavetz, Justice Thomas
acknowledged that the “Court’s longstanding assumption” was
correct: “that a consumer-fraud regulation that compels the
disclosure of certain factual information in advertisements may
intrude less significantly on First Amendment interests than an
outright prohibition on all advertisements that have the potential to
mislead.”98 However, he simultaneously “doubt[ed] that it justifie[d]
an entirely different standard of review for regulations that compel,
rather than suppress, commercial speech.”99 There are several
problems with this perspective. First, if consumer-fraud regulations
that compel factual information disclosures tread less significantly on
the First Amendment than commercial speech restrictions do, it is

disclosure requirements, accidental ingestion is common; for example, 75 percent of those
surveyed in Canada with peanut allergies ingested peanuts accidentally. Saleh Al-Muhsen et al.,
Peanut Allergy: An Overview, 168 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 1279, 1282 (2003).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (1958); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4852d (1992) (requiring information on
lead-based paint hazards to be disclosed before the sale or lease of residential housing built prior
to 1978).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964).
95. 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1934).
96. Texas law requires advertisements for timeshare interests to disclose the purpose of the
solicitation, how the recipients’ information will be used, and the marketers’ company
information. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 221.031 (Vernon 2007). Minnesota law requires credit
card applications to disclose rates, fees, and conditions, among other information, to protect
consumers. MINN. STAT. § 325G.42 (2011). Florida law requires that brochures, advertisements,
notices, tickets, and entry forms used by charities for a “drawing by chance” disclose the rules,
source of funds, and information about the organization, among other things. FLA. STAT.
§ 849.0935 (2011).
97. See Post, supra note 19, at 27–28.
98. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1343 n.1 (2010)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
99. Id.

Winter 2012]

NO NEED TO BREAK NEW GROUND

407

unclear how this appreciation should take practical form if the
constitutional tests on their validity do not reflect this difference. The
former necessarily requires reduced constitutional protection.
Second, under Justice Thomas’s view, both regulations that compel
and restrict commercial speech would be subject to strict scrutiny;
under the Court’s precedent this is often fatal to a speech
regulation.100 This would defeat consumer fraud regulations, which
are universally regarded as necessary and constitutional. Finally,
Justice Thomas believes the First Amendment should protect core
and commercial speech the same.101 However, core speech cannot
similarly be compelled. And in Justice Thomas’s view, basic
disclaimers cannot be compelled in the core speech category either,
which further undermines the validity and practicality of his
perspective.102 Accepting this viewpoint of commercial speech
would mean the demise of the current commercial disclosure system
supporting an informed and efficient marketplace.
The government’s ability to require factual commercial
disclosures is necessarily based on the reduced constitutional
protection supporting commercial speech.103 The same allowance
does not exist in the realm of core speech. If commercial speech
were strictly protected, it would logically follow that such
disclosures would be subject to stricter scrutiny, under which they
would not likely survive. The result would be a failure of the current
regulatory environment. The Court could not intend for this to occur
since it unanimously upheld a commercial disclosure requirement
under the reasonable relationship test in 2010.104 Blanket increased
protection for commercial speech cannot coexist with the need for
and constitutionality of commercial disclosure requirements.

100. The application of strict scrutiny to restrictions on core speech is almost always fatal. But
see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding, in a plurality opinion, a statute
prohibiting campaigning within one hundred feet of the entrance to a polling place under the strict
scrutiny test under the First Amendment).
101. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I
have observed previously that there is no ‘philosophical or historical basis for asserting that
“commercial” speech is of “lower value” than “noncommercial” speech.’” (citing 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996))).
102. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 980–82 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
103. See Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Compelled Speech Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine:
The Case of Menu Label Laws, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 159 (2009).
104. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1339–40.
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B. Core Speech Cannot
Be Similarly Compelled
In direct contrast with regulations that compel factual
disclosures in the commercial market, core speech cannot be
similarly compelled.105 In the realm of fully protected speech,
requiring substantive disclosures is untenable under the First
Amendment. Speakers are protected from being compelled to utter
beliefs and facts against their will in all facets of core speech,
ranging from newsletters106 to parades107 to automobile license
plates.108 The First Amendment recognizes a “constitutional
equivalence of compelled speech and compelled silence in the
context of fully protected expression.”109 Thus, the freedom
applicable to core speech necessarily comprises “the decision of both
what to say and what not to say.”110
Although most core speech cases protect citizens from
compelled statements of belief,111 in Riley v. National Federation of
the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.,112 the Court explained that these
other “cases cannot be distinguished simply because they involved
compelled statements of opinion while here we deal with compelled
statements of ‘fact’: either form of compulsion burdens protected
speech.”113 The Court struck down a provision that required the
yearly disclosure of the average percentage of gross receipts turned
over to charities by a fundraiser for all charitable solicitations that it
conducted in the state.114 Government-mandated substantive factual
disclosures, like beliefs, are subject to strict scrutiny in the realm of
fully protected speech.115
The Court has permitted minimal disclaimers in the realm of
core speech. These are often minor mandates to disclose the source
105. See Pomeranz, supra note 103, at 171–73.
106. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
107. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
108. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
109. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988).
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (holding unconstitutional a state law that required
New Hampshire motorists to display the state motto—“Live Free or Die”—on their license
plates); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding unconstitutional
a state law requiring schoolchildren to recite the Pledge of Allegiance and to salute the flag).
112. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
113. Id. at 797–98.
114. Id. at 798.
115. Id. at 795–801.
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of the speech rather than factual information, as in the commercial
disclosure area.116 The Justices have had mixed opinions regarding
even these minor directives. In Citizens United v. FEC,117 the
majority upheld disclosure requirements consisting of the name and
address of the person or group that funds electioneering
communications and a disclaimer statement showing whether the
communication was authorized by the candidate.118 Similarly, in
Riley, the Act’s provisions requiring a professional fundraiser to
disclose to potential donors his or her name and employer, including
the address, were not challenged.119 However, in a footnote, the
majority explicitly found these provisions to be constitutionally
acceptable, stating: “[N]othing in this opinion should be taken to
suggest that the State may not require a fundraiser to disclose
unambiguously his or her professional status. On the contrary, such a
narrowly tailored requirement would withstand First Amendment
scrutiny.”120 The majority also distinguished between the disclaimers
it found permissible and more substantive ones it would have found
problematic: “[W]e would not immunize a law requiring a speaker
favoring a particular government project to state at the outset of
every address the average cost overruns in similar projects, or a law
requiring a speaker favoring an incumbent candidate to state during
every solicitation that candidate’s recent travel budget.”121
In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,122 the majority
struck down, under strict scrutiny, Ohio’s law requiring all written
documents designed to influence voters in an election (including
leaflets—at issue in the case) to state “the name and residence or
business address of the chairman, treasurer, or secretary of the
organization issuing the same, or the person who issues, makes, or is
responsible therefor.”123 Unlike Riley and Citizens United, McIntyre
involved a private citizen whose personal information was not found

116. Minimal disclaimers are common in the commercial realm. See, e.g., 21 CFR § 101.5
(2011) (requiring packaged food labels to specify the name and place of business of the
manufacturer, packer, or distributor).
117. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
118. Id. at 913–16.
119. Riley, 487 U.S. at 786.
120. Id. at 799 n.11.
121. Id. at 798.
122. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
123. Id. at 345 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (West 1988)).
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to be relevant to the political message.124 The Court found that the
law served the state’s interest in deterring false statements,125 even
though the First Amendment does allow false statements in political
speech.126
Justice Scalia dissented in McIntyre, which was inconsistent
with his First Amendment position in Riley. Justice Scalia joined the
majority in Riley with the exception of its footnote stating that the
state may require a fundraiser to disclose his or her professional
status.127 Justice Scalia found that the forced disclosure by the
professional solicitor of his professional status should be subject to
strict scrutiny because it involves core First Amendment speech.128
Conversely, Justice Scalia dissented from the majority opinion in
McIntyre, stating that the “law at issue here, by contrast, forbids the
expression of no idea, but merely requires identification of the
speaker when the idea is uttered in the electoral context. It is at the
periphery of the First Amendment . . . .”129
Justice Thomas concurred with the result in McIntyre130 and
dissented from the portion of the opinion in Citizens United
upholding the disclaimer and disclosure requirements.131 Justice
Thomas found that corporate disclosure, disclaimer, and reporting
requirements are unconstitutional compulsions of fact.132 In his
opinion, any compulsions in the core realm should be subject to strict
scrutiny.133 Under this rationale, no disclaimer or disclosure
requirements could ever be considered constitutionally permissible
unless they were commercial in nature and tied only to preventing
deception.134 Yet Justice Thomas would still subject them to strict
scrutiny, which is untenable under the Court’s precedent and in the

124. Id. at 348–49.
125. Id. at 350–51.
126. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
127. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 803–04 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
128. See id.
129. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 378 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring).
131. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 980 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 980–81.
133. See id. at 980.
134. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1342–45
(2010) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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context of the current consumer protection regulatory structure
described above.
If the Court found a constitutional equivalence for core and
commercial speech, the result would be that only minimal
disclaimers would be permitted in the commercial context. Such
simple disclaimers would be insufficient to inform and protect the
public and rectify potential abuses that the government currently has
the authority to address in the commercial marketplace. This is not a
minor point. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights, Inc.,135 the Court explained why regulations compelling fully
protected speech could not survive strict scrutiny:
The compelled-speech violations in Tornillo and
Pacific Gas also resulted from interference with a speaker’s
desired message. In Tornillo, we recognized that “the
compelled printing of a reply . . . tak[es] up space that could
be devoted to other material the newspaper may have
preferred to print,” and therefore concluded that this rightof-reply statute infringed the newspaper editors’ freedom of
speech by altering the message the paper wished to express.
The same is true in Pacific Gas. There, . . . when the state
agency ordered the utility to send a third-party newsletter
four times a year, it interfered with the utility’s ability to
communicate its own message in its newsletter.136
If commercial speech regulations were subject to strict scrutiny,
commercial actors would have this argument available to them and
the current regulatory system would become constitutionally suspect.
Under this scenario, companies could still be required to disclose the
names and addresses of their businesses, but they would have a
strong argument that the required disclosure of any other information
(e.g., investor-related information under the Securities Exchange Act
or ingredients and allergen information under the Nutrition Labeling
and Education Act) violates their First Amendment rights not to
speak, interferes with their “ability to communicate [their] own
message,” and “takes up space that could be devoted to other
material.”137

135. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
136. Id. at 64 (citations omitted).
137. Id.
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This is not a hypothetical concern. Upon passage of New York
City’s menu-labeling ordinance,138 the New York State Restaurant
Association challenged the factual disclosure ordinance based on the
very same First Amendment grounds described above in Rumsfeld.139
They unsuccessfully made the exact same arguments about covered
food service establishments’ menu boards, but since the ordinance
required only factual commercial disclosures, subject to less exacting
review, the reviewing courts upheld the ordinance under Zauderer.140
In the commercial context, substantive disclosures are often required
to protect and inform consumers in a way that they could not be
protected or informed absent the divergent constitutional values and
protections underlying the commercial speech doctrine.141
The very fact that the Court was able to decide Milavetz and
Zauderer under reasonable basis review is necessarily due to the
reduced protection for commercial speech under the First
Amendment. Commercial disclosures are based on the constitutional
values underlying the protection of commercial speech: its
information function and value to consumers. The Court upheld the
disclosure requirements at issue in Milavetz and Zauderer precisely
because it recognized that commercial speech garners a different
level of constitutional protection than core speech.
IV. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
FOR RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMERCIAL SPEECH IS NECESSARY
Intermediate scrutiny for restrictions on commercial speech is
appropriate in light of the different values underlying its
protection.142 Because commercial speech is protected to ensure the
“free flow of commercial information,”143 the Court has guarded
commercial speech against “unwarranted governmental regulation”

138. N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE § 81.50.
139. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, No. 08 Civ. 1000 (RJH), 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 31451 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008), aff’d, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009).
140. Id.
141. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115–16 (2d Cir. 2001).
142. Akhil Reed Amar, How America’s Constitution Affirmed Freedom of Speech Even
Before the First Amendment, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 503, 507 (2010).
143. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976).
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through the four-part intermediate test created in Central Hudson,
which states:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech
to come within that provision, it at least must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether
the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than
is necessary to serve that interest.144
The Court’s commercial speech cases have primarily involved
government restrictions on advertising itself and focused on society’s
interest in, and consumers’ right to receive, commercial
information.145 Intermediate scrutiny reflects the values inherent in
the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech, while it
simultaneously recognizes the government’s legitimate and
substantial interest in regulating overreaching commercial
communication.146 Although it has been argued that the Central
Hudson test is not appropriate to determine whether government
restrictions on commercial speech are constitutional because it is not
strict enough,147 the Court frequently strikes down commercial
speech restrictions after comparing the government’s interests to
those underlying the First Amendment.148 In very rare instances, the
144. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561, 566 (1980).
145. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (discussing solicitation
and advertisement of compounded drugs); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)
(discussing tobacco billboards and retail advertisements); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v.
United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (discussing broadcast advertising of lotteries and casino
gambling); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (discussing retail liquor
price advertising); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (discussing labeling and
advertising of beer alcohol content); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (discussing advertising by an
electrical utility); Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (discussing advertisement and promotion of
prescription drug prices). The basis for the First Amendment protection for “commercial
advertising,” as it has been called, see, e.g., United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S.
418, 426 (1993), is society’s interest in the free flow of commercial information. Va. Pharmacy,
425 U.S. at 764.
146. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561–66.
147. See, e.g., Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring). However, Justice Thomas
has used the Central Hudson test to examine commercial speech regulations in Coors Brewing,
514 U.S. 476.
148. See, e.g., Thompson, 535 U.S. 357; Lorillard, 533 U.S. 525; Greater New Orleans
Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. 173 ; 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484; Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. 476.
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Court has found that the commercial speech at issue was subject to
abuse and overreaching, thus warranting restraint.149 In light of the
fact that commercial speech restrictions rarely withstand Central
Hudson review, stricter scrutiny is not required in order to protect
commercial speakers from government infringement of their First
Amendment rights.
The full Central Hudson test has proven difficult for courts to
apply and difficult for the government to meet.150 Justices’ and lower
courts’ divergent understandings of how to apply the test is not a
reason to retreat from intermediate scrutiny. Rather, the confusion
counsels in favor of the Court developing the framework more
clearly in future cases.
The four prongs of Central Hudson do not seem to capture the
true test of the constitutionality of commercial speech regulations.
The only aspect that all Justices have agreed on is that the First
Amendment does not protect false,151 deceptive, and misleading
commercial speech, which falls under the first inquiry of Central
Hudson. The ability of government to restrict misleading and
deceptive commercial speech is also one of the most important
aspects of First Amendment jurisprudence that separates commercial
from core speech and further counsels in favor of maintaining
intermediate protection for the former.
A. Misleading and Deceptive
Commercial and Core Speech Are
Vastly Different from Each Other
In the commercial realm, deceptive and misleading speech is not
protected. This has been ratified in prong one of Central Hudson152
and embraced by all Justices, including those who expressly reject
149. E.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (finding legal solicitation improper, but decided prior to the
creation of the Central Hudson test).
150. See, e.g., Thompson, 535 U.S. at 360 (affirming the Ninth Circuit’s finding that the
commercial speech restrictions violated the First Amendment); Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 539
(reversing the First Circuit’s finding that commercial speech restrictions did not violate the First
Amendment); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 182–83 (reversing the Fifth
Circuit’s finding that the commercial speech restrictions did not violate the First Amendment); 44
Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 489–95 (reversing the First Circuit’s finding that the commercial speech
restrictions did not violate the First Amendment); Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 478 (affirming the
Tenth Circuit’s finding that the commercial speech restrictions violated the First Amendment).
151. See discussion supra Part II for a comparison of false commercial and core speech.
152. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
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the Central Hudson test or intermediate scrutiny for commercial
speech in general.153 The most important point that emerges from
categorical rejection of First Amendment protection for deceptive
and misleading commercial speech is that this is, and only can be,
true in the commercial realm.
On the other hand, in the realm of core speech, misleading and
deceptive speech are strictly protected. The freedom of political and
religious speakers to state beliefs, ideas, and their version of the facts
is the underpinning of the First Amendment protection for speech.154
The First Amendment guards against government interference in this
realm for the benefit of both the listener and the speaker, and this
“vital interchange of thought” is “indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth.”155 Strict protection is warranted to
“maximize the speaker’s freedom of participation within public
discourse,”156 to get his or her opinion “accepted in the competition
of the market.”157 This is true without consideration of the “truth,
popularity, or social utility” of the core “ideas and beliefs which are
offered.”158 Thus, both the speaker and the listener can decide which

153. E.g., Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 476. In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court struck
down the commercial speech restriction under the Central Hudson test. Although the full court
agreed that the commercial actor had a “constitutional right to give the public accurate
information about the alcoholic content of the malt beverages that it produces,” Justice Stevens
concurred, stating that strict scrutiny was necessary:
If Congress had sought to regulate all statements of alcohol content . . . in order to
prevent brewers from misleading consumers as to the true alcohol content of their
beverages, then this would be a different case. But absent that concern, . . . the statute
at issue here should be subjected to the same stringent review as any other contentbased abridgment of protected speech.
Id. at 496–97 (Stevens, J., concurring). Note that Stevens began his argument by expressing that
the case “would be different” if the statute at issue intended to protect consumers from misleading
speech. This inquiry is only relevant within the context of commercial speech. See also Milavetz,
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1343 n.1 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“I have no quarrel with the principle that advertisements that are false or misleading,
or that propose an illegal transaction, may be proscribed.”); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350, 383 (1977) (“Advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading of course is subject to
restraint.”).
154. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 892 (2010) (“[Such] speech is central to the
meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”).
155. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 775 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
156. Post, supra note 19, at 40.
157. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
158. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444–45 (1963).

416

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:389

opinions and beliefs form the truth for themselves and their
participation in politics and religion.159
Conversely, there is no value to consumers or society for
misleading or deceptive commercial speech.160 The crux of why
commercial speech is and should be treated differently from fully
protected expression is that “the public and private benefits from
commercial speech derive from confidence in its accuracy and
reliability.”161 Since the First Amendment’s concern for commercial
speech is based on its information function, the listener only benefits
from accurate commercial information.162 To this end, the Court has
recognized that the First Amendment is not an obstacle to the
government dealing effectively with deceptive and misleading
commercial speech.163
A mislabeled product or misleading advertisement undermines a
well-functioning free market economy and has the potential to hurt
consumers financially or physically.164 Consumers need valid
commercial information to properly allocate their resources. They do
not have the time or financial ability to verify all commercial speech
in order to discover deficiencies in speech made for profit.165 As
there is no outside tool for immediate verification to correct such
deception, consumers would be left to purchase at their own peril if
159. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 777
(1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that, in terms of the press, journalists “must often attempt
to assemble the true facts from sketchy and sometimes conflicting sources”).
160. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens J., concurring) (“[F]alse
or misleading speech in the commercial realm also lacks the value that sometimes inheres in false
or misleading political speech.”).
161. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
162. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980); see
also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 432 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (finding that government regulation of misleading and deceptive speech “is
consistent with [the] Court’s emphasis on the First Amendment interests of the listener in the
commercial speech context”); Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 (finding that the government has an
interest in ensuring the “stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely”).
163. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771; see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United
States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1343 n.1 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I have no quarrel with the
principle that advertisements that are false or misleading, or that propose an illegal transaction,
may be proscribed.”); Bates, 433 U.S. at 383 (“Advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading
of course is subject to restraint.”).
164. See Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765; see also Post, supra note 19, at 41 (stating that a
court should regard consumers as “free and equal citizens” when determining the boundaries of a
public communicative sphere).
165. See Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765; see also Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (“The First
Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of
advertising.”).
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the First Amendment did not allow for government intervention on
their behalf.166 Therefore, the distinction between commercial and
core speech is crucial in the context of misleading and deceptive
speech.
The federal regulatory system relies on these distinctions. For
example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) protects consumers
from a diverse range of misleading and deceptive commercial speech
that could otherwise be financially or physically harmful.167 For
instance, the FTC has protected vulnerable consumers from a
marketer’s misleading claims that an herbal product could cure
cancer,168 a scam promising “cash” for envelope-stuffing,169 and a
cereal manufacturer’s false claims that its cereal was “clinically
shown to improve children’s attentiveness.”170 Similarly, the
Securities and Exchange Commission prohibits a registered
investment company from using a materially deceptive or misleading
name to incorrectly suggest investment in government securities,171
and it also prohibits false and misleading statements in proxy
solicitation materials.172 These restrictions protect investors who
have less complete information than the companies seeking their
investments.173
166. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he
consequences of false commercial speech can be particularly severe: Investors may lose their
savings, and consumers may purchase products that are more dangerous than they believe or that
do not work as advertised. . . . The evils of false commercial speech, which may have an
immediate harmful impact on commercial transactions, together with the ability of purveyors of
commercial speech to control falsehoods, explain why we tolerate more governmental regulation
of this speech than of most other speech.”).
167. About the Bureau of Consumer Protection, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
http://ftc.gov/bcp/about.shtm (last visited Nov. 4, 2011).
168. Daniel Chapter One, No. 9329, 2009 FTC LEXIS 157 (F.T.C. Aug. 5, 2009); see also
Default Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction, Global Web Promotions, No. 04C-3022
(N.D. Ill. June 16, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423086/050920defjudg0
423086.pdf (granting injunctive relief for deceptive diet and human growth hormone products).
169. Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction, Stuffingforcash.com
Corp., No. 02-C-5022 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/
stuffingforcashstip.pdf.
170. Order to Show Cause and Order Modifying Order, Kellogg Co., 149 FTC No. C-4262
(F.T.C. May 28, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823145/100602kellog
gorder.pdf.
171. SEC Investment Company Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 270.35d-1(a) (2011).
172. SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2011).
173. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (“Since the advertiser knows his
product and has a commercial interest in its dissemination, we have little worry that regulation to
assure truthfulness will discourage protected speech.”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 777 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The [commercial]
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The government must be able to regulate misleading and
deceptive commercial speech, and such regulation is only possible
because a different level of protection exists for commercial and core
speech. The Court has distinguished among three types of
commercial speech that have a tendency to mislead or deceive and
that are consequently amenable to regulation by the government:
inherently misleading, actually misleading (proven to be so), and
potentially misleading commercial speech.174 The government may
ban or otherwise restrict inherently and actually misleading
commercial speech, but it can only order correction, revision, or
increased factual disclosures for potentially misleading commercial
speech.175 If strict protection was applied in this context, courts
would have to differentiate between inherently and actually
misleading speech that would not be protected by the First
Amendment and potentially misleading speech that would be strictly
prohibited. Granting potentially misleading speech strict protection
would prohibit the government from requiring corrections or
disclosures to rectify any potential for deception. This is nonsensical.
If the Court were to rule that commercial speech is subject to
strict protection, it would undermine the government’s ability to
effectively address misleading and deceptive commercial speech.176
Justice Thomas does not consider these to be mutually exclusive. In
Milavetz, Thomas stated that he has “no quarrel with the principle
that advertisements that are false or misleading, or that propose an
advertiser’s access to the truth about his product and its price substantially eliminates any danger
that governmental regulation of false or misleading price or product advertising will chill accurate
and nondeceptive commercial expression.”).
174. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
175. See id.
176. See, e.g., Joe Conte Toyota, Inc. v. La. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 24 F.3d 754, 757 (5th
Cir. 1994) (finding the term “invoice” to be inherently misleading in automobile advertisements);
Adams Ford Belton, Inc. v. Mo. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 946 S.W.2d 199, 204 (Mo. 1997)
(finding the term “invoice” to be inherently misleading); see also Am. Acad. of Pain Mgmt. v.
Joseph, 353 F.3d 1099, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding a physician’s use of the term “board
certified” to be inherently misleading because he did not meet the statutory requirements for
using the term); N.C. State Bar v. Culbertson, 627 S.E.2d 644, 650 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (finding
an attorney advertisement that he was “published” in the Federal Law Reports to be inherently
misleading); Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc., 494 A.2d 804, 812 (N.J. 1985) (finding the terms
“dealer invoice,” “cost,” “inventory,” and “invoice” misleading in automobile advertisements); cf.
Piazza’s Seafood World, L.L.C. v. Odom, No. 04-690, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25991, at *16–22
(E.D. La. Dec. 27, 2004) (applying Central Hudson and striking down the speech restriction after
finding the term “Cajun” to be only potentially misleading because plaintiff’s customers were
seafood wholesalers and presumably sophisticated buyers).
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illegal transaction, may be proscribed.”177 However, in Lorillard,
Justice Thomas “doubt[ed] whether it is even possible to draw a
coherent distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech.”178 Thus, it is unclear how Justice Thomas would propose to
separate the type of misleading and deceptive speech that may be
proscribed from that which is constitutionally protected. Given that
there is already concern about distinguishing commercial from
noncommercial speech, it would be extremely difficult, and
unnecessary, to come up with a new test that distinguishes truthful,
non-misleading commercial speech from any other commercial
speech deserving the highest level of First Amendment protection.
Subjecting all speech restrictions to the same strict review would
collapse the distinction between commercial and core speech. This
would be improper, however, because misleading and deceptive
commercial speech needs to remain unprotected, while misleading
and deceptive core speech must remain protected in order to advance
the values underlying the First Amendment. The government must
retain its ability to restrict false, deceptive, and misleading
commercial speech in the marketplace. Providing equivalent
protection to both would decidedly convolute future First
Amendment analysis.
If the Court were to upset this precedent, future inquiries would
be complicated. Courts would have to determine (1) whether the
speech at issue was formerly considered commercial or core speech;
(2) whether it was part of a public debate; (3) whether it was
misleading and deceptive; and (4) whether a restriction would, thus,
be subject to strict scrutiny or no scrutiny at all.179 Such a revised
constitutional understanding would not only be unwise but the task
of line-drawing would be rendered significantly more demanding and
complicated than simply distinguishing commercial from core
177. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1343 n.1 (2010)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
178. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring).
179. Such an outcome would perhaps produce future opinions that resemble the dissent to the
dismissal of certiorari in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky. 539 U.S. 654, 665 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer would have decided the First Amendment claims based on whether the speech at
issue in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky was considered commercial or core. Id. at 667. He opined that Nike’s
false statements were “about public matters in public debate” and not commercial speech as the
California Supreme Court found. Id. Breyer would have thus subjected any restrictions on the
speech to heightened scrutiny. Id. at 681. If commercial and core speech were subject to the same
test, cases touching on deceptive or misleading speech would be as convoluted as this opinion.
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speech. The Constitution does not call for such a restructuring or
revised understanding of the First Amendment. The significant
difference between core and commercial speech cannot be negated
by haphazardly applying an identical constitutional analysis to both.
B. Intermediate Scrutiny
Needs Further Explanation
As discussed extensively above, strict protection is not
appropriate for commercial speech, and thus intermediate protection
must be maintained. Therefore, the Court should clarify the
commercial speech doctrine to maintain this standard. The remaining
three prongs of Central Hudson do not seem to capture the entire
inquiry. Even in cases where the Court agrees that the restriction at
issue directly addresses commercial speech, Justices come to
different conclusions as to the application of the test.180
IMS Health addressed a Vermont statute that prohibited the sale,
disclosure, and use of pharmacy records containing “prescriberidentifying information” for purposes of marketing.181 Through this
method, the pharmaceutical manufacturers used the prescribers’ own
information for “detailing” by their representatives as a marketing
tactic in an effort to increase sales of brand-name prescription
drugs.182 The state enacted the law to stop this practice out of
concern that it was a violation of physicians’ privacy interests and
that it would lead to the over-prescription of brand-name drugs (as
opposed to generics), which would in turn drive up medical costs for
the state.183 The Second Circuit found that the law violated the First
Amendment rights of the pharmaceutical marketers and data
miners.184 However, the First Circuit found that similar laws in
Maine and New Hampshire were valid regulations of commercial
conduct and characterized the data at issue as no different than any
other commodity subject to commercial regulation.185
In IMS Health, the Court said it was applying Central Hudson,
but to the extent that it did, it actually mentioned the prongs in

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659–60 (2011).
Id. at 2660.
Id. at 2681.
Id. at 2662.
Id. at 2666–67.
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reverse order.186 Because the majority found that the law was an
unconstitutional content- and speaker-based restriction and
unconventionally cited core speech cases throughout its analysis,
IMS Health is not a reliable vehicle to analyze the Court’s most
recent view on the application of the Central Hudson test.187 It could
be that the majority’s position on Central Hudson is that the test is
no longer relevant, but the case did not present an opportunity to
adequately overrule the test. The dissent found the law to be an
economic regulation that affected speech in an indirect way and
thought it should be analyzed under the rational basis standard.188
Both perspectives are supported by the case law.189 At best, the case
could be an outlier due to the poorly drafted legislative findings190
and the disagreement over whether this was a speech case at all.
Nonetheless, the case does bring to the forefront outstanding issues
that the Court needs to resolve if it plans to maintain intermediate
scrutiny for commercial speech restrictions.
The different perspectives of the majority and dissenting
opinions in IMS Health are not simply subjective differences of
opinion on how the application of intermediate scrutiny determines
the constitutionality of the law at issue in that case. Rather, the
opinions raise issues relevant to intermediate review that are either

186. Id. at 2653, 2669–72.
187. Id. at 2664, 2667 (finding “heightened judicial scrutiny” to be warranted, stating that it
was subjecting the restriction to Central Hudson analysis but not undertaking traditional Central
Hudson analysis, and referencing core speech cases throughout); see also Mello & Messing,
supra note 4, at 1250 (“The term ‘heightened scrutiny’ is critical and pointedly ambiguous. It
might be a mere synonym for the midlevel scrutiny applied under the Central Hudson test—but it
might mean far more.”).
188. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2673–75 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
189. See supra note 4. Compare IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2653 (holding that a Vermont
statute involving commercial speech violated the First Amendment by applying the intermediate
scrutiny test developed in Central Hudson, but also mentioning core speech cases throughout the
majority opinion), with 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 528–34 (1996)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the Central Hudson test should have been applied in the
majority’s First Amendment analysis); compare IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2673–85 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Vermont statute should have been analyzed using the rational basis
test or otherwise upheld under intermediate scrutiny), with Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott,
521 U.S. 457, 469–70 (1997) (holding that state requirements that California fruit growers
contribute to advertising expenses were an economic regulation that could not be afforded
intermediate scrutiny under the Central Hudson test).
190. Outterson, supra note 45, at e31(1) (“Vermont’s statute had a fatal self-inflicted wound.
By prominently announcing that the state intended to tip the balance in the ‘marketplace for
ideas’ against drug companies, the law dug itself into a constitutional hole: state interference with
that marketplace was likely to provoke the ire of a majority of the Supreme Court.”).
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missing from the Central Hudson test or need further explanation to
clarify the test going forward.191 Outstanding issues remain regarding
how content-based and speaker-based distinctions factor into the
commercial speech doctrine and how and whether the commercial
speech doctrine will be regarded in the future.
1. How Do Content-Based Distinctions
Factor into the Analysis?
Several Justices have stated that all content-based restrictions of
speech, including commercial speech, should be subject to strict
scrutiny.192 The majority in IMS Health found that the law was
content-based because it forbade the sale of information “subject to
exceptions based in large part on the content of a purchaser’s speech.
For example, those who wish to engage in certain ‘educational
communications’ may purchase the information. The measure then
bars any disclosure when recipient speakers will use the information
for marketing.”193 The law did restrict the use of information for
commercial speech purposes, but this is not necessarily an
outstanding fact.194 The dissent found that regulatory programs, such
as the one at issue, “necessarily draw distinctions on the basis of
content” and used as an example electricity regulators who “oversee
company statements, pronouncements, and proposals, but only about
electricity.”195

191. Post, supra note 19, at 54–55 (“By settling quickly and easily into a test whose bland
provisions were indifferent to a disciplined account of the constitutional value of commercial
speech, the doctrine has allowed fundamental differences of perspective to fester and increase.
These differences now threaten to explode the doctrine entirely.”).
192. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 577 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“Whatever power the [s]tate may have to regulate commercial speech, it may not use that power
to limit the content of commercial speech . . . ‘for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair
bargaining process.’ Such content-discriminatory regulation—like all other content-based
regulation of speech—must be subjected to strict scrutiny.” (partially quoting 44 Liquormart, 517
U.S. at 501)); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496–97 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“I see no reason why the fact that such information is disseminated on the labels of
respondent’s products should diminish that constitutional protection. On the contrary, the statute
at issue here should be subjected to the same stringent review as any other content-based
abridgment of protected speech.”).
193. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2663 (citation omitted).
194. Id. at 2677 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
195. Id. (“If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First Amendment
protection, . . . it must be distinguished by its content.” (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761–62 (1976))).
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The majority’s problem with the content-based regulation was
that the government failed to present a “neutral justification” for its
content-based restriction.196 However, concerns over content
neutrality are traditionally relevant in core speech cases only197 and
have not seriously been questioned in the commercial speech context
because “most regulations of commercial speech are content
based.”198
Commercial speech is and has historically been identified by
and regulated according to its content. Commercial speech is by its
very definition content-based: speech that “propose[s] a commercial
transaction”199 and “expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience.”200 In Central Hudson, the
Court explained that outside the commercial speech context, “the
First Amendment prohibits regulation based on the content of the
message” but that the features that distinguish commercial speech
“permit regulation of its content.”201
The Court upheld a commercial speech restriction in Florida
Bar v. Went For It, Inc.202 that was decidedly content- (and speaker-)
based.203 The law at issue restricted communication based on the

196. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2672 (“The Court has noted, for example, that ‘a State may
choose to regulate price advertising in one industry but not in others, because the risk of fraud . . .
is in its view greater there’ . . . . Here, however, Vermont has not shown that its law has a neutral
justification.” (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388–89 (1992))).
197. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733, 2738 (2011); IMS
Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2685 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court reaches its conclusion through the
use of important First Amendment categories—‘content-based,’ ‘speaker-based,’ and ‘neutral’—
but without taking full account of the regulatory context, the nature of the speech effects, the
values these First Amendment categories seek to promote, and prior precedent.”); United States v.
Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811–13 (2000).
198. Post, supra note 19, at 49 n.222, 56 n.243 (“[T]he distinction between content-neutral
and content-based regulations is best interpreted as expressing understandings of specific
government purposes deemed impermissible within public discourse. It is therefore of no small
significance that the distinction has virtually no application within the domain of commercial
speech, where most regulation is content based.” “[M]ost regulations of commercial speech are
content based. The constitutionality of such regulations would present significant problems if
commercial speech were conceptualized as a form of public discourse.” (citation omitted)).
199. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762.
200. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
201. Id. at 564 n.6.
202. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
203. Id. at 620 (1995) (upholding a rule that a “lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to
be sent, . . . a written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining
professional employment if: (A) the written communication concerns an action for personal
injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to
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subject matter, or content, of the speaker’s letter.204 In IMS Health
the Court conflated core and commercial speech concepts, forging a
dangerous path for the commercial speech doctrine. Content-based
core speech distinctions are subject to strict scrutiny,205 so it should
follow that content-based commercial speech distinctions are subject
to intermediate scrutiny. Such was the case in Went For It. However,
IMS Health makes it unclear whether this distinction remains,
threatening the future of the commercial speech doctrine in general
and the application of intermediate scrutiny specifically.
2. How Do Speaker-Based Distinctions
Factor into the Analysis?
In IMS Health, the majority also found improper the Vermont
law’s speaker-based distinction because it “disfavor[ed] specific
speakers, namely pharmaceutical manufacturers.”206 Conversely, the
dissent explained that, in the context of regulatory programs, it is not
“unusual for particular rules to be ‘speaker-based,’ affecting only a
class of entities, namely, the regulated firms.”207 Relying on energy
regulators as an example, the dissent went on to explain that the
regulator “might require the manufacturers of home appliances to
publicize ways to reduce energy consumption, while exempting
producers of industrial equipment.”208
Previously the Court had found that commercial speech-based
regulations may deliberately address only problematic speakers. In
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, decided prior to Central Hudson,
the Court analyzed a state-authorized prohibition on lawyers who
engage in direct, in-person solicitation of prospective clients and
found that such a restriction on commercial speech survived First
Amendment scrutiny.209 Conversely, in Edenfield v. Fane,210 the

whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster
occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the communication”).
204. Compare Went For It, 515 U.S. 618 (upholding a content-based commercial speech
restriction prohibiting attorneys from soliciting accident and disaster victims), with Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (striking down a content-based commercial speech restriction
applied to attorneys regarding advertising prices for services).
205. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
206. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011).
207. Id. at 2678 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
208. Id.
209. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
210. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
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Court analyzed a state law prohibiting certified public accountants
from in-person, direct solicitation of prospective clients and found
that the restriction on commercial speech violated the First
Amendment.211 The primary difference between the two cases was
the identity of the speaker: “Because ‘the distinctions, historical and
functional, between professions, may require consideration of quite
different factors,’ the constitutionality of a ban on personal
solicitation will depend upon the identity of the parties and the
precise circumstances of the solicitation.”212
Post-Central Hudson cases have confirmed the holding in
Ohralik and have made it clear that the case “depended upon certain
‘unique features of in-person solicitation by lawyers.’”213 It was
precisely the distinction between the speakers that made the speech
at issue either problematic and amenable to restriction or
constitutionally protected and not amenable to restriction.
Intermediate scrutiny allows the government to narrowly tailor
restrictions to address the source of the problem without implicating
speech that is not part of the problem.214 Such a distinction would be
unconstitutional in the realm of core speech (e.g., nurses, but not
chefs, can engage in political debate). It is unclear why the
distinction is permissible in the context of regulating lawyers versus
accountants, but not in the context of regulating pharmaceutical
manufacturers versus educators. These distinctions need to be
fleshed out in future commercial speech cases. The majority in IMS
Health retreated from precedent that established the commercial
speech doctrine without explicitly explaining whether it intended to
amend or otherwise overhaul the doctrine.

211. Id. at 763.
212. Id. at 774 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 773 n.25 (1976)).
213. Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 641 (1985)); see
also Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding Florida Bar Rules prohibiting
personal injury lawyers from sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and relatives for
thirty days after an accident or disaster); cf. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2663 (“Vermont’s law thus
has the effect of preventing detailers—and only detailers—from communicating with physicians
in an effective and informative manner.”).
214. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
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3. The Pivotal Prongs
of Central Hudson
In order to ground the majority opinion in IMS Health in the
commercial speech doctrine, one must trust that the majority found
that the law failed Central Hudson analysis. This would be the case
because the Vermont law did not allow speakers to use the
commercial information for marketing purposes, thereby
unconstitutionally restricting commercial speech. According to the
dissent, however, the law restricted the use of information gathered
pursuant to a regulatory mandate and “threaten[ed] only modest
harm to commercial speech.”215 The dissent would have subjected
the law to rational basis review, but found that it should have been
sustained under Central Hudson nonetheless.216
IMS Health, of course, is the most recent Supreme Court case
where the majority ostensibly applied Central Hudson to the
regulation at issue. The case brings to the forefront some questions
about the application of the third and fourth prongs to speech
restrictions and highlights the evolution of the commercial speech
doctrine since its inception.217
The second prong seems to capture the interests at stake under
Central Hudson and has been the most straightforward part of the
inquiry.218 Regulated speakers rarely challenge the government’s
interest, and the government has been able to successfully proffer an

215. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2680 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Thompson v. W. States
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 387–88 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I do not deny that the statute
restricts the circulation of some truthful information. It prevents a pharmacist from including in
an advertisement the information that ‘this pharmacy will compound Drug X.’ Nonetheless, this
Court has not previously held that commercial advertising restrictions automatically violate the
First Amendment. Rather, the Court has applied a more flexible test. It has examined the
restriction’s proportionality, the relation between restriction and objective, the fit between ends
and means. In doing so, the Court has asked whether the regulation of commercial speech
‘directly advances’ a ‘substantial’ governmental objective and whether it is ‘more extensive than
is necessary’ to achieve those ends.”).
216. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2684 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I consequently conclude that,
even if we apply an ‘intermediate’ test such as that in Central Hudson, this statute is
constitutional.”).
217. Thank you to Tuongvy Le for her superb analysis of prongs three and four of the Central
Hudson test in, Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Seth T. Mermin & Tuongvy Le, Constitutional Barriers to
Legislating Restrictions on Food Marketing to Children: The Aftermath of Lorillard v. Reilly
(2008) (unpublished report) (on file with Author) (report to the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
(RWJF) funded by a grant from the RWJF to National Policy and Legal Analysis Network to
Prevent Childhood Obesity (NPLAN) to the Yale Rudd Center for Food Policy & Obesity).
218. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
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interest that the Court agrees is substantial.219 States have satisfied
the second prong by asserting interests similar to the interests at issue
in IMS Health,220 such as protecting the health, safety, and welfare of
citizenry,221 protecting privacy,222 and preventing commercial
exploitation.223 In Went For It, the state proffered all of these
interests, and the Court upheld the law.224 Since Went For It, several
Justices have stated that the government may not prohibit truthful
commercial speech “for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a
fair bargaining process.”225 This position conflicts with the language
of the second prong by holding that the state’s interest in the
preservation of a fair bargaining process is the only legitimate reason
to regulate commercial speech. The Central Hudson test imposes no
such limitation;226 however, it might be that this is the only interest
that will ultimately survive the Court’s review in the future.
The majority’s departure from methodically applying Central
Hudson in IMS Health leaves all prongs open to question. If Central
Hudson is still relevant, the third and fourth prongs have proven the
most crucial in determining the constitutionality of commercial
speech restrictions. Both have evolved throughout the years,
becoming increasingly difficult to pass.227
219. But see Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 483–86 (1995) (rejecting the state’s
asserted interest in facilitating state efforts to regulate alcohol under the Twenty-First
Amendment, but accepting the alternative interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of
its citizens).
220. The IMS Health Court reiterated the importance of protecting privacy and found that the
government’s “stated policy goals” of lowering the costs of medical services and promoting
public health “[might] be proper,” but that the law “[did] not advance them in a permissible way.”
IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2670, 2672.
221. Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 485 (finding that the Government has a significant interest in
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (“With respect to the second step [of Central Hudson], none of the
petitioners contests the importance of the State’s interest in preventing the use of tobacco
products by minors.”).
222. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624–25 (1995).
223. Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 (1989) (“The Court of Appeals
also held, and we agree, that the governmental interests asserted in support of the resolution are
substantial: promoting an educational rather than commercial atmosphere on SUNY’s campuses,
promoting safety and security, preventing commercial exploitation of students, and preserving
residential tranquility.”).
224. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 635.
225. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 577 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996)).
226. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
227. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 375–76 (2002); Lorillard, 533
U.S. at 564–65.
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a. Prong three
The third inquiry under Central Hudson asks “whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted.”228
In practice, this analysis translates into a review of the evidentiary
record to determine whether the governing body compiled enough
evidentiary support to show that the speech restriction directly and
materially advances the proffered interest.229 The dissent in IMS
Health explicitly addressed this prong and found that “Vermont
compiled a substantial legislative record” to lead the “legislature to
conclude that the statute ‘directly advance[d]’ each of these
objectives.”230 The majority did not address the evidentiary record
but rather found that because evidence existed that was contrary to
the state’s purpose in passing the law, such evidence effectively
nullified the weight of evidence presented.231 The majority relied on
the views of “some” doctors, as opposed to the dissent, which relied
on the legislative record at large.232
This begs the question of how much evidence is truly required to
satisfy the third prong of the analysis.233 In several cases the Court
asserted that it does not require the government to provide “empirical
data . . . accompanied by a surfeit of background information” to
prove that a commercial speech restriction will alleviate the
government’s articulated harm to a material degree.234 However, the
Court actually does require substantial evidence to pass prong three,
and the government has passed this prong only by offering empirical
data and background information.235
228. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 555.
229. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999).
230. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2682 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 2671 (majority opinion) (“The defect in Vermont’s law is made clear by the fact
that many listeners find detailing instructive. Indeed the record demonstrates that some Vermont
doctors view targeted detailing based on prescriber-identifying information as ‘very helpful’
because it allows detailers to shape their messages to each doctor’s practice.”).
232. Id.
233. The Supreme Court deferred to the legislature’s judgment of the efficacy of a given
restriction on speech in Posadas de P.R. Associates. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328,
342–43 (1986) but overruled that aspect of its decision in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484, 509 (1996), stating that the majority in Posadas “clearly erred in concluding that it
was ‘up to the legislature’ to choose suppression over a less speech-restrictive policy.”
234. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (providing that Massachusetts must demonstrate actual harm if
it seeks to sustain a restriction on the labeling of tobacco products).
235. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 558 (holding that the government passed prong three by
submitting studies by the Food and Drug Administration, Surgeon General, and the Institute of
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It is unlikely that any amount of evidence would have swayed
the majority in IMS Health that the statute at issue passed prong three
because of the perceived deficiencies bordering on core speech
concerns. But it is disconcerting for future government regulations
that the opinions of “some” doctors were enough to discount the rest
of the legislative record compiled by the state.236 What is clear is that
substantial evidence must be compiled, but whether this will matter
in the long run likely depends on the other aspects of the commercial
speech restriction in question.
b. Prong four
Prong four has proven to be the most difficult to pass. Under this
inquiry, the Court seeks to determine whether the speech restriction
“is not more extensive than is necessary” to serve the government’s
interest.237 Here, the Court analyzes whether the scope of the
restriction is “in proportion to the interest served” and
simultaneously requires that the government consider “lessburdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech.”238
The Court has said that the “‘fit’ between . . . ends and . . . means”
must be “reasonable”;239 however, it seems clear that more than a
reasonable relationship must exist under prong four.
The majority in IMS Health found that the statute in question
was not “coherent” enough, meaning that it was not narrowly
tailored, and that the government did not adequately consider
alternatives to the speech restriction.240 The majority suggested that
doctors could deal with the issue themselves (by closing the office
door to detailers) and found that the state offered “no explanation
why remedies other than content-based rules would be

Medicine); Went For It, 515 U.S. at 626–27 (“The [Florida] Bar submitted a 106-page summary
of its 2-year study of lawyer advertising and solicitation” including both statistical and anecdotal
data, surveys, and complaints. “The anecdotal record mustered by the Bar is noteworthy for its
breadth and detail.”); cf. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 US 761, 771 (1993) (stating that the regulation
failed because the government presented “no studies that suggest personal solicitation of
prospective business clients by CPA’s creates the dangers of fraud, overreaching, or
compromised independence that the Board claims to fear”).
236. See IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2669.
237. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
238. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 632 (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
410, 417 n.13 (1993); Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
239. Id.
240. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2668.

430

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:389

inadequate.”241 The dissent disagreed crucially on this point, finding
that there was no “similarly effective ‘more limited restriction.’”242
The dissent found that the alternatives suggested by the majority and
the respondents were not “equally effective” and would continue to
burden public health and privacy.243
Analysis under prong four has progressively provided stricter
protection for commercial speech.244 The very existence of
alternatives has increasingly become a determining factor under
prong four, which is problematic since some alternative option to any
proposed regulation will likely always exist. The question remains
unclear on how effective an alternative must be to be considered a
valid alternative.
In Thompson, the Court was divided over appropriate
alternatives under prong four. The majority found that there were
several non-speech-related means of accomplishing the
government’s objective and the government failed to explain why the
means would be “insufficient” to advance the purported interest.245
The dissent contended, however, that that the alternatives would not
sufficiently accomplish the government’s safety objectives.246 In 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,247 the plurality found that the
speech restriction failed prong four because the non-speech-related
alternatives “would be more likely to achieve the State’s goal.”248
The Court has moved from debating the efficacy of the
alternatives presented to simply noting the existence of alternatives.
Now, the extent to which efficacy even matters is unclear. IMS
241. Id. at 2669–70 (“Physicians can, and often do, simply decline to meet with detailers,
including detailers who use prescriber-identifying information. Doctors who wish to forgo
detailing altogether are free to give ‘No Solicitation’ or ‘No Detailing’ instructions to their office
managers or to receptionists at their places of work.” (citation omitted)).
242. Id. at 2683.
243. Id. at 2683–84.
244. Robert Post, Prescribing Records and the First Amendment—New Hampshire’s DataMining Statute, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 745, 747 (2009) (“This last requirement is so arbitrary
that it constitutes an open invitation for judges to bring political prejudices to bear in resolving
cases. Antiregulatory judges will tend to strike down statutes on the basis of this requirement;
proregulatory judges will tend to uphold them.”).
245. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).
246. Id. at 385–86.
247. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
248. Id. at 507 (stating that the regulation prohibiting advertisement of liquor prices failed
prong four because “alternative forms of regulation that would not involve any restriction on
speech would be more likely to achieve the State’s goal of promoting temperance” (emphasis
added)).
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Health followed the Court’s directive in Thompson that if “the First
Amendment means anything, it means that regulating speech must be
a last—not first—resort.”249 One must now ask whether there will
ever not be a non-speech way to fulfill the government’s purpose.
4. A Future for
Commercial Regulations?
The ability of the government to pass Central Hudson may be a
thing of the past. The law in Went For It was content- and speakerbased, but the majority found that it passed Central Hudson.250 It is
unclear whether Went For It represents the only type of commercial
speech restriction that the government may avail or whether it is an
outlier because attorney advertising generally has been subject to
different standards than advertising for other products and
services.251
The law at issue in Went For It was upheld largely because it
left open a significant number of alternative channels of
communication.252 Disregarding the fact that the law upheld in Went
For It was content- and speaker-based, it regulated speech in a
manner akin to a time, place, and manner restriction because it
allowed attorneys to undertake the prohibited communication after a
short period of time. On aspect of the law at issue in Lorillard might
be similarly considered, in that it prohibited tobacco advertising on
billboards within a one-thousand-foot radius of a school or
playground.253 However, the Court found that this was not narrowly
tailored so that the remaining locations available for billboards were
not meaningful alternative channels for communication.254 One has
249. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 373.
250. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995). The Court upheld a restriction on inperson solicitation by attorneys in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978), but
decided that case prior to Central Hudson.
251. In re Felmeister & Isaacs, 518 A.2d 188, 199 (N.J. 1986) (“We do not believe that the
Constitution requires that the rules governing attorney advertising be the same as those applicable
to beer, automobiles, or casino hotels.”); see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471
U.S. 626, 677 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring and dissenting) (“The Court’s commercial speech
decisions have repeatedly acknowledged that the differences between professional services and
other advertised products may justify distinctive state regulation.”).
252. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 502 (“[L]ast Term we upheld a 30-day prohibition against a
certain form of legal solicitation largely because it left so many channels of communication open
to Florida lawyers.”).
253. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561–62 (2001).
254. Id. at 563.
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to wonder if a five-hundred-foot radius would have sufficed in 2001,
or if one hundred feet would have passed in 2011.
Perhaps even more worrisome than whether a commercial
speech restriction will ever survive intermediate review is that we
might be seeing an erosion of the commercial speech doctrine
without any serious consideration of its consequences. At first blush,
one could blame the holding in IMS Health on a poorly drafted
section of the Vermont statute’s legislative findings.255 However,
because the case decided a circuit split and overruled the First
Circuit’s finding that the Maine version of the law without the
problematic language was constitutional,256 this case may
disconcertingly mark a new line of jurisprudence whereby economic
regulations that tangentially implicate speech are now subject to
some “heightened” form of First Amendment scrutiny.257
Justice Breyer’s dissent in IMS Health cautioned:
The Court reaches its conclusion through the use of
important First Amendment categories—“content-based,”
“speaker-based,” and “neutral”—but without taking full
account of the regulatory context, the nature of the speech
effects, the values these First Amendment categories seek to
promote, and prior precedent. At best the Court opens a
Pandora’s Box of First Amendment challenges to many
ordinary regulatory practices that may only incidentally
affect a commercial message. At worst, it reawakens
Lochner’s pre-New Deal threat of substituting judicial for

255. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (“When it enacted § 4631(d), the
Vermont Legislature found that the ‘marketplace for ideas on medicine safety and effectiveness is
frequently one-sided in that brand-name companies invest in expensive pharmaceutical marketing
campaigns to doctors.’ ‘The goals of marketing programs,’ the legislature said, ‘are often in
conflict with the goals of the state.’ The text of § 4631(d), associated legislative findings, and the
record developed in the District Court establish that Vermont enacted its law for this end.”
(citations omitted)).
256. IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2010), vacated, IMS Health Inc. v.
Schneider, 131 S. Ct. 3091 (2011).
257. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2664; id. at 2679 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Moreover, given the
sheer quantity of regulatory initiatives that touch upon commercial messages, the Court’s vision
of its reviewing task threatens to return us to a happily bygone era when judges scrutinized
legislation for its interference with economic liberty. History shows that the power was much
abused and resulted in the constitutionalization of economic theories preferred by individual
jurists.”).
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democratic decision-making where ordinary economic
regulation is at issue.258
IMS Health’s perplexing and disordered majority opinion,
confusingly interspersing core and commercial speech case law,
leaves unclear not only the status of Central Hudson, but also the
state of basic regulations that may tangentially implicate speech.
Since precedent seems to be of little value in the commercial speech
context, one can only hope that a future Supreme Court confines the
breadth of the holding to one of poorly drafted legislative intent
mistakenly implicating speech in an otherwise valid commercial
regulation.
V. CONCLUSION
No valid justification for departing from intermediate scrutiny
has been raised by Justices or parties in First Amendment cases.
Whatever perceived difficulty there is in applying this standard can
be rectified by the Court’s continued clarification through subsequent
cases. The significant difference between core and commercial
speech cannot be negated by simply requiring an identical
constitutional analysis to apply to both. There is no standard First
Amendment test applied to all core speech or all commercial speech.
Courts must necessarily decide many questions about the speech
before they can apply the appropriate test.
Commercial speech is fundamentally different from core speech.
Commercial communication is subject to abuse; the possibility of
deception is always at issue because the commercial speaker always
has more information about his products and services than the
listener, and it would be impossible in many instances for the listener
to verify the accuracy of commercial communications. The
government’s ability to require factual commercial disclosures and to
restrict false, deceptive, and misleading commercial speech must be
maintained to support a well functioning, efficient, and transparent
free market economy. Requiring the same protection for commercial
258. Id. at 2685 (citations omitted); see also Post, supra note 244, at 746–47 (“Commercialspeech doctrine has since evolved into a disturbingly effective vehicle for invalidating otherwise
unexceptional regulations of commerce . . . . It seems apparent that if First Amendment coverage
is indiscriminately applied to all channels of data transmission [such as in the case of Sorrell v.
IMS Health], and if the Central Hudson test is used to determine the First Amendment protection
accorded such channels, we will face an increasingly capricious constitutional regime in which
regulations will be constantly challenged and frequently invalidated.”).
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and core speech ignores the intricacies within First Amendment
jurisprudence and the constitutional values underlying the protection
of each. Even worse, subjecting commercial regulations that
tangentially implicate speech to First Amendment scrutiny threatens
to destroy the regulatory system firmly established in the United
States. The Court should maintain the current distinctions between
commercial and core speech and reject all future opportunities to
overhaul the commercial speech doctrine.

